| Subject: | RE: [socialcredit] The Red Dawn | | Date: | Thursday, March 9, 2006 23:59:15 (+0000) | | From: | John G Rawson <johngrawson @.......com>
|
Interesting factual material. I waited for "Frank" to become Langstone, but
it did come later in the piece. He and other monetary reformers departed from
the Labour party with Lee, and Langstone actually stood for the Social Credit
League in the Roskill electorate in Auckland in 1954 or possibly '57.
Whether then or later, the position of Minister of Agriculture became known as
a political death sentence for Labour personnel. And, I think was used to get rid
of unfavoured people.
Strachey's comment, I believe, puts its finger exactly on the crucial
difference of opinion between the socialist and socred ,opvements.
Thanks for very valuable data.
John R.
From: MODERATOR <socredus@yahoo.com>
Reply-To: socialcredit@elistas.com
To:
socialcredit@elistas.com
Subject: [socialcredit] The Red Dawn
Date: Thu, 9
Mar 2006 07:46:18 -0800 (PST)
>F_A_I_R U_S_E C_L_A_I_M_E_D
>
>CHAPTER FOUR - THE
"RED DAWN", 1934 - 38.
>
>From February to July 1934 Parliament's
Monetary
>Committee held an enquiry into the New Zealand
>financial system. This
was in large part to answer
>attacks upon the system as a major, or for some
the
>only, cause of the economic depression. The Reserve
>Bank Act of 1933 had moved
the New Zealand Pound off
>the gold standard, and parity with the British
Pound,
>to a 125 to 100 ratio to the British Pound, ie a
>devaluation. Until 1933 New
Zealand had even used
>British currency. The Labour
representatives on the
>Committee were Bill Schramm, M.P. for Auckland
East
>from 1931, James Munro, first elected M.P. for Dunedin
>North in 1922, and
Frank. They were joined by Captain
>Harold Rushworth, Country Party M.P. for Bay
of
>Islands from 1928, who was a supporter of credit
>reform.
>
>The Committee
received ninety eight proposals or
>statements, many of which supported some
variety of
>monetary reform. C.H. Douglas, the guru of reformers,
>proposed a
certificate of wealth for everyone, with
>national dividends paid out equally on
a regular
>basis. The Douglas Credit Movement of New Zealand on
>the other hand
proposed a National Credit Authority to
>determine what it regarded as just
prices, and ignored
>Douglas' national dividends. Discrepancies between
>Douglas
and the New
Zealand Movement that bore his
>name were noted by the Committee. On behalf of
the
>Labour Party Walter Nash supported a central credit
>authority, a National
Investment Board and
>nationalisation of the banking system. His
Labour
>colleague, Rex Mason, persisted in detailing the
>monetary reform
legislation he regularly presented to
>Parliament.
>
>The government appointees
to the Committee delivered a
>report calling on the Bank of New Zealand to
follow
>what it termed the national interest and not the
>profits of its private
shareholders, recommended a
>unified Government Mortgage Board and supported
a
>variable ratio of 120 to 130 New Zealand Pounds to the
>British Pound. The
Majority report also condemned the
>notion of stabilising prices, claiming it
would
>require total government
control of purchasing,
>production, pricing and sale to achieve, and issued
a
>damning indictment of both the Douglas and Douglas
>Credit Movement
submissions. Downie Stewart, who had
>resigned from the Coalition government over
its
>decision to devalue the New Zealand Pound, issued his
>own minority report
contending that New Zealand's
>economic problems were simply due to a lack of
markets
>for goods, and that economic changes arising from
>having the new
Reserve Bank needed to be worked
>through before there were any further
changes.
>
>The other minority report was signed by the three
>Labour representatives and
Rushworth. They concluded
>that there was a gap or defect in the money
supply,
>rejected linkage to the British Pound, called for a
>price level index,
regarded the State as the
sole
>creator of currency and credit, sought to close the
>purchasing power gap
for both pensioners and
>producers, and believed New Zealand could maintain
a
>stable internal price level, while retaining exchange
>parity with other
countries with fluctuating price
>levels by rationing foreign exchange. Others
within
>the Labour Party, especially Walter Nash, disagreed
>with the minority
report conclusions, particularly
>over money supply.
>
>R. Hill, in "The quest
for control, the New Zealand
>dairy industry and the guaranteed price 1921 -
1936
>(Auckland University, 1974), claims Labour only turned
>to cheaper loans,
rather than land nationalisation, to
>win the rural vote after 1925, and that
Frank
>supported the creation of internal credits from 1932.
>However, from the
beginning of
his Parliamentary
>career Frank supported bank nationalisation as a means
>of
achieving cheaper credit for farmers and by 1932
>had "placed his views on
currency reform and kindred
>subjects before the house on many occasions"
(P.D.
>1932, v234, p826). Some Government M.P.s feared his
>credible delivery
gave weight to his unorthodox views
>and support for monetary reform.
>
>Frank's
status within the Party increased. He had
>assisted during the Hutt by-election
in 1930, which
>was won by Walter Nash, and in 1931 along with
>addressing
meetings at Public Works camps within
>Waimarino he also spoke in Marsden,
Wanganui,
>Rangitikei and Waitomo (MS 270, folders 352 and 353).
>He believed
that Labour would win Rangitikei in the
>next election (WTU MS 1501, folder 3, L
to Nash
>4/4/1931). In
the event it took two elections to win
>Rangitikei.
>
>In 1933 he was
successfully nominated for Party
>President for a year. Backed by the Waimarino
L.R.C.
>and the Ohakune Branch, he was also supported by the
>Wellington builders
and general labourers' union. He
>had not previously served on the National
Executive.
>At the 1933 Conference he also reported speaking to
>meetings in
Auckland, Taranaki, South Canterbury, the
>Waikato and at the Motueka by-election
(WTU MS 270,
>folder 355). He was joined at the 1933 Conference by
>his son
Jack.
>
>Frank sat on the second bench in Labour's
>Parliamentary line-up, was
campaign manager for
>Elizabeth McCombs at the Lyttelton by-election
in
>September 1933 and had even been approached, amongst
>others, to contest the
leadership on
Holland's death
>later in 1933. He refused, but would have at that time
>backed
John A. Lee if he had stood.
>
>R. Clifton in "Douglas Credit and the Labour
Party
>1930 - 1935" (Victoria University, 1961) claims Labour
>adopted cheap
loans after 1928 and that Frank adopted
>Douglas Credit ideas in 1932. The
Douglas Credit
>Movement of New Zealand was actually formed in January
>1933, but
few adherents had penetrated the King
>Country as only Te Kuiti was represented
at the
>inaugural conference. By 1935 there were branches
>within the Waimarino
electorate at Taumarunui, Ohakune
>and Raetihi. The Movement was in fact one
amongst many
>supporting monetary reform of some description, but
>had the
backing of the Auckland Farmers' Union for its
>particular brand of financial
reform. Clifton
talked
>to Frank when he was a Social Credit member in the
>late 1950's, when
Frank claimed to have been the
>political link with Douglas Credit adherents
prior to
>the 1935 General Election. However, Rex Mason was
>ideologically closer
to them. Clifton also contends
>that Frank wanted to use the Unemployment Fund
as
>security for credits. In fact in Parliament at the
>time Frank actually sought
to abolish the Unemployment
>Board in favour of Public Works Department
schemes.
>Clifton also contends that Labour's former
>anti-capitalist fervour became a
mere anti-bank
>crusade by the time of the 1935 Election, with Labour
>intent on
merely solving a money deficiency gap.
>
>However, in 1935 John A. Lee claimed
"all socialists
>are monetary reformers" (P.D. 1935, v241, p693), with
>Frank
seeking "socialized money, money for use and not
>as a dominating controlling
factor" (P.D. 1935, v242,
>p477). The socialist economist John Strachey in
his
>"Social Credit; an economic analysis" (London,
>Gollancz, 1936), criticised
Douglas for failing to
>distinguish between the costs of raw materials
for
>producers and the costs of final consumer goods when
>claiming his money
gap. He also believed fixing prices
>by law would not stop inflation, as it was
contrary to
>the laws of supply and demand. Strachey instead
>believed there was
already enough purchasing power in
>the community to buy all the consumer goods
available,
>and that the real issue was the need to distribute
>purchasing power
wider in the community. Socialists
>Hugh Gaitskell and G.D.H. Cole in "What
everybody
>needs to know
about money" (London, Gollancz, 1936)
>supported nationalising deposit banking
in order to
>better control the supply of credit to finance a
>national
industrial development plan. They contended
>one couldn't socialise everything at
once and banking
>was the prerequisite. While disagreeing with Strachey
>over the
amount of purchasing power available, Frank
>would have agreed with Gaitskell and
Cole that the
>banking system was the key.
>
>Frank directly criticised Douglas'
ideas in a letter
>to a monetary reformer B. Beckerleg on 22 March 1934.
>Frank
argued that a stabilised guaranteed internal
>price level was "superior and more
practicable than
>the Douglas just price factor". He continued "if we
>stand for
a money economy as the best distribution
>medium for goods and services then ...
sufficient
>money should be put in the ordinary flow of
>circulation to
completely do the job... it would not
>be difficult to fix an internal price
level ...the
>infusing of money into circulation would not interfere
>with
prices, but would result in a wider distribution
>of available goods and prices
... the value of trade
>would increase correspondingly." The state would tax
>the
increased profits from increased turnover and use
>the money for health,
education, superannuation and
>economic development. The amount of money could
be
>increased or decreased as necessary.
>
>In the same letter Frank also took
issue with Douglas'
>just price discount formula, calling it "defective"
>and
leading to Communism, "not that I am opposed to
>Communism, but I don't think it
good philosophy to
mix
>drinks". The "National Dividend the people will secure
>in the Social
Services and National Superannuation ...
>superior to the Douglas proposals" and
"the Labour
>Party's programme is more practical that that of Major
>Douglas. In
fact if there had been no slump, there
>would have been no Douglasism in New
Zealand. The
>Labour Party in season and out of season have been
>calling
attention to the fraudulent capitalistic
>system manifested in our financial
machine".
>
>Once in office Frank publicly confirmed "the Labour
>Party does not
go to the Douglas Social Credit
>authorities, nor to any other political party
for
>advice" (P.D. 1936, v244, p631). Rather, he believed
>"the socialization of
a thing means the using of it in
>the interests of the whole of the community"
(P.D.
>1938,
v250, p84), through the elected government. "The
>people, instinctively, always
have turned, and always
>will turn, to the Government to find a solution
of
>their problems" (P.D. 1938, v251, p428). In essence
>socialism equated to
human justice.
>In Australia the Labor Party was also dealing with the
>appeal of
Douglas Credit. Baiba Berzins ("Labour
>History", No. 17, June 1970, p148 -160)
describes how
>Australian Douglas Credit supporters in the early
>1930's
criticised the banks in pamphlets and lectures,
>and were thus intellectual
allies for monetary
>reformers within Labor. However, their incompatible
>long
term objectives, and potential electoral threat,
>led the New South Wales Labor
Party to ban dual
>membership in 1933. Queensland followed in 1934 and
>soon
after Douglas Credit supporters
broke into
>factions.
>
>Towards the end of 1935 Frank believed "one can
hear
>the death rattle in the throat of the government"
>(P.D., 1935, v243,
p207). Having only won around 34.9%
>of the vote in 1931, when voters opted to
give the new
>United Reform coalition a chance, Labour still had a
>lot of ground
to make up. Nevertheless in early
>November 1935 Frank was confident of a Labour
victory
>when speaking to a group of supporters at a bush
>sawmill (Ted Thompson,
29/9/1997). Frank had in the
>previous year spoken in South Canterbury,
the
>Wairarapa, North Auckland and on the West Coast.
>
>Frank may have regretted
the storm created by his
>second political pamphlet. There were in fact
two
>versions printed by the Ohakune Times. The first was
>"Labour's plan, by
Frank
Langstone, M.P., National
>President, N.Z. Labour Party. The first step in
the
>march from bankruptcy to prosperity". This was headed
>as a householder
containing advertisements for twenty
>four Taumarunui and three Raetihi and
Ohakune
>businesses, and appealed for donations to the
>secretary of the
Waimarino Labour Representation
>Committee, William Seator who worked as a
labourer.
>Obviously this was just for distribution within
>Waimarino. The other
was also published in Ohakune in
>1934, but was for national distribution as "The
first
>step in the march from bankruptcy to prosperity,
>Labour's plan, by Frank
Langstone, M.P. National
>President N.Z. Labour Party". This instead
had
>advertisements for donations to the Labour Party
>nationally and for copies
of the Party newspaper "The
>New
Zealand Worker".
>
>The pamphlet included an example that a farmer who
>sold
butter for sixpence would be reimbursed one
>shilling and three pence, but if
they wanted to buy an
>import then they would have to pay the full one
>shilling
and three pence. Opponents seized upon this
>as claiming that in reality this
meant an exchange
>rate of 250%. The Labour Party National Executive
had
>previously rejected the pamphlet for publication.
>Frank's later pamphlet
"The case for the guaranteed
>price by Frank Langstone M.P." (Ohakune, 1935)
also
>featured state control of banking, credit and
>currency, foreign exchange
parity and an internal
>stabilised guaranteed price level, but excluded
any
>mention of a 250% exchange rate.
>
>In fact while attracting some monetary
reformers to
>Labour,
Frank may well have deterred other possible
>voters wary of such changes.
Certainly the government
>made great play with his pamphlet into 1935.
Frank
>served on the Labour Party policy committee for the
>1935 election
manifesto, was an ardent campaigner in
>marginal seats and promoted the candidacy
of those who
>supported monetary reform, including Charles Barrell
>in Hamilton.
At one stage Fred Young from the
>hotelworkers' union had contemplated standing
in
>Hamilton.
>
>At the 1935 General Election Frank faced two
>opponents. Cecil
August Boles, a grocer and Mayor of
>Taumarunui since 1929, represented the
Coalition
>government, and Henry William Buckrall Littlewood, a
>farmer and a
former Mayor of Raetihi who had
>previously stood in 1922, stood as a National
United
>candidate. The
"N.Z. Herald" of 18/11/1935 (page 14)
>even believed "there is a chance that Mr
C.A. Boles
>... will beat Mr F. Langstone ... who has become
>somewhat
discredited within his own party because of
>his varying and illogical
expositions of Labour's
>guaranteed prices policy". In the election
campaign
>Boles also criticised Frank's absence from the
>electorate while
campaigning in Lyttelton and said he
>should be seeing to projects such as the
Tokaanu
>roadworks. Littlewood refused to support any
>Labour-moved no confidence
motion in the Coalition
>government and opposed Labour's defence and state
bank
>proposals.
>
>At the election Frank won 60% of the vote cast with
>Boles
receiving only 37.43% and Littlewood 206 votes.
>With a majority of 1863 Frank
carried every polling
>booth with over
a hundred voters, including for the
>first time Raetihi, with 56.48% of the
vote. He even
>won 10 votes against 11 at the Chateau polling booth.
>Frank won
Boles' home base of Taumarunui with 55% of
>the vote and won the absent vote by
68.5%. The
>turn-out was 92.8% and informal votes were 53.
>Nationally Labour
increased its vote to 46.1%, but
>with a dramatic increase to 53 seats. In the
central
>North Island Labour also picked up the neighbouring
>Rotorua,
Rangitikei, Hawkes Bay and Waipawa
>electorates, but on minority votes as only
Rotorua and
>Hawkes Bay remained Labour in 1938.
>
>With a majority of seats
Labour sought to form a
>government. The initial press speculation was that
>Bill
Lee Martin was the unofficial choice for both the
>Lands and Agriculture
portfolios, but it was
noted
>that "on length of service alone ... R. McKeen, ...
>W.J. Jordan and Mr
F. Langstone must be considered as
>candidates for Ministerial office" ("N.Z.
Herald"
>3/12/1935 p13). Lee Martin became Minister of
>Agriculture at number
eleven in Cabinet ranking,
>McKeen became Chief Whip and Jordan High
Commissioner
>in London. It was then speculated that Frank might
>become Minister of Marine
and Pensions ("N.Z. Herald"
>5/12/1935 p15). However, Frank was one of
Savage's
>immediate choices and entered Cabinet at number twelve
>as Minister of
Lands and Commissioner of State
>Forests, along with Minister in charge of Lands
for
>Settlements, Scenery Preservation, Discharged
>Soldiers' Settlement and the
Valuation and Tourist and
>Publicity Departments. An astute choice as all
these
>portfolios
were relevant to his local concerns in
>Waimarino over a number of
years.
>
>When allocated his Cabinet portfolios it was said of
>Frank that
"latterly he has devoted much attention to
>economic questions and is a leading
exponent of the
>Labour Party's policy in this regard" ("N.Z. Herald"
>6/12/1935
p15). Frank formally became a Cabinet
>Minister from 6 December 1935 and was
allocated as
>Minister to Parliament's Lands committee. Lee Martin
>became
Minister of Agriculture and was allocated to
>the Agricultural and Pastoral
committee. Frank took
>over Gordon Coates' Ministerial home at 123A
Tinakori
>Road, and then had a home built for him on the grounds
>of what had
been Ariki Toa. He also retained his
>Ohakune house until the late
1930's.
>
>From 14 October 1936 Frank was also
allocated to the
>Native Affairs committee, and worked closely with
>Savage who
held the Native Affairs portfolio. James
>(Jim) O'Brien, Labour M.P. for
Westland, chaired the
>Native Affairs committee from 1936 to 1942. Frank
had
>good relations with local Maori in the King Country,
>six years experience
on the Native Affairs Committee
>and could speak Maori to a degree.
>
>Fellow
Labour M.P. Clyde Carr wrote about his
>Parliamentary colleagues in his
"Politicalities"
>(Wellington, "National Magazine", 1936) and referred
>to Frank
(pages 32 to 34) as combining an ability with
>numbers and words, as well as a
selflessness.
>Political issues were always more important to Frank
>than the
compromises needed for a top leadership
>position. John A. Lee on the other hand
barely
>concealed his
personal ambitions, and Frank tried to
>console him when he lost out on a
position in Cabinet.
>According to Lee, Peter Fraser claimed to Lee that
he
>could convince Savage to include him in Cabinet at a
>later date, but Frank
told Lee that Fraser was playing
>a double game trying to ensure that Lee was
kept out
>of Cabinet. Lee was given the role of Under-secretary
>for Housing,
outside of Cabinet.
>
>In 1936 Frank was responsible for three pieces
of
>legislation. The first was the Reserves and other
>Lands Disposal Bill. This
was an annual legislative
>validation of the sale, reservation or disposal
of
>reserves, Crown lands and endowments. As an example,
>one of the provisions
of the 1937 Bill was to
>authorise the Taumarunui Borough Council to grant
a
>lease to the Taumarunui Fire Board.
Frank had
>responsibility for these Bills to 1940.
>
>The 1936 Native Land
Amendment Bill empowered the
>Board of Native Affairs to develop Maori land
and
>better co-ordinate with the Lands Department, the aim
>being to "make of the
Natives a productive class of
>people and a free and independent people" (P.D.
1936,
>v247, p1079). The Act provided for security of tenure
>for Maori occupiers
of developed lands, and protection
>for Maori owners of lands in cases where the
occupiers
>were not sole owners through rental leases. By the end
>of 1936 there
were 1,388 Maori (6,635 including
>family) on 49 settlement schemes, with 161,941
out of
>a total of 668,885 acres under development. At the
>time Maori owned
around 4.5 million acres in total. At
>the end of 1937 there were around 5,000
directly
>working on development schemes. Such schemes were not
>new as Ngata
had fostered them while he was Minister.
>
>The third was the Native Purposes
Bill. This was an
>annual legislative adjustment of claims and disputes
>relating
to Maori land. For example the 1936 Bill set
>aside land at Wairoa for a memorial
to the late Sir
>James Carroll, which was to include a carved meeting
>house, and
gave a tribal committee authority over the
>Raukawa Marae at Otaki. Frank
believed that previous
>policies individualising Maori land titles
created
>administrative problems, and believed that it would
>have been better if
tribes controlled whole blocks and
>leased them for the benefit of the whole
tribe. Frank
>also supported the secret ballot for Maori, equal
>pensions for
both Maori and Pakeha
and regarded the
>Treaty of Waitangi as a "sacred agreement entered
into
>indicating that New Zealand was not a conquered
>country" (P.D. 1938, v250,
p86).
>
>Frank also provided the operative regulations and
>funding to enact the
1935 Native Housing Act,
>previously passed by the Coalition. However, in
1937
>Frank caused trouble with Orakei Maori. From Pakeha
>settlement of Auckland
in the nineteenth century,
>Maori lived in Mangere, Awataha in Northcote until
a
>1926 eviction or around the Orakei basin. In mid 1937
>a committee of Government
and Auckland City Council
>representatives, including John A. Lee who intended
to
>develop pakeha state housing in the area, decided that
>the 73 adults and 48
children remaining in the small
>Maori village at Orakei should be removed (WAI
9,
>p80). Maori on the site had suffered high rates of
>tuberculosis, dysentery
and enteric fever and some
>were living in tents and shacks. They still owned
at
>least two and a half acres, along with a quarter acre
>church and cemetery site.
Their title to other land
>had been under dispute for years.
>
>The government
had claimed it had purchased another 40
>acres from them, but in the meantime had
let them
>continue to live there as there was no immediate use
>for the land. As
acting Native Affairs Minister, Frank
>proceeded to carry out the Committee's
decision, but
>on his return from overseas Savage reversed Frank's
>removal order
as he had promised the area to local
>Maori.\par \tab At the end of 1937 almost
200 houses
>had either been built or repaired specifically for
>Maori.
Other considerations were also important, for
>example Frank opposed building a
Maori village near
>the Pukekohe market gardens as the area didn't offer
>Maori a
firm economic base. In 1938 Frank amended the
>Native Housing Act to assist
setting aside Crown and
>other lands for Maori housing, disposing of
dwellings
>and to include those with less than half Maori blood
>in the
definition of Maori.
>
>Following a special study into Maori unemployment,
>Frank
encouraged co-operation between the Native
>Affairs Department and the
Unemployment Branch of the
>Labour Department to find employment for
Maori,
>including special funding for land development. In his
>State Forest
portfolio Frank supported afforestation
>to avoid soil erosion. Generally the
public servants
>responsible to him were
impressed with his
>administrative abilities.\par \tab New Zealand
took
>military possession of Western Samoa from Germany in
>August 1914, at the
commencement of the First World
>War, and from 1919 exercised a League of
Nations
>Mandate there. The administration of that mandate
>provoked the development of
a independence movement,
>the Mau. Labour had long regarded New Zealand's
record
>in Western Samoa as far from satisfactory, but Frank
>had not been at the
forefront of public concern.
>Nevertheless, in June 1936 Frank and Jim
O'Brien,
>Labour M.P. for Westland, were dispatched on a
>goodwill mission to
Western Samoa. They left for Apia
>on 16 June 1936 on the "Maui Pomare". As well
as
>investigating local grievances and conditions in
>Western Samoa, their
mission was to also seek
guidance
>on the choice of a new administrator. Alfred C.
>Turnbull had been
appointed as acting Administrator,
>and in the meantime had been able to unite
the
>different political factions.
>
>While not directly negotiating with the
Mau, the
>mission spent a month meeting different sections of
>the community. An
Ordinance allowing for banishment
>from a village, and the cancellation of Samoan
titles,
>was repealed, as were the Native Personal and Medical
>Tax Ordinances,
with any payment of arrears cancelled.
>The proclaimation of the Mau as a
seditious
>organisation was revoked, restrictions on free
>movement repealed and
Olaf Frederick Nelson, a leader
>of the Mau, able to return from exile. Further,
the
>export price of bananas was lifted, a boon to native
>Samoans who made up
60% of
exporters. There was also
>an increase in the representation of native Samoans
on
>the advisory Legislative Council, and increased
>funding for both health and
education.
>
>At the time the conservative "Pacific Islands
>Monthly", while
acknowledging previous blunders and
>welcoming the end of trouble with the Mau,
also voiced
>the concerns of European planters (Pacific Islands
>Monthly
17/6/1936 p5, 21/7/1936 p68, 19/8/1936 p3-4,
>16/4/1940 p72 & 3/1943 p8). The
population of Western
>Samoa was around 45,000, with 2,500 being described
as
>European or half-caste. Planters preferred that
>Western Samoa was developed
along more commercial
>lines, and were highly critical of Frank's intention
>to
repatriate Chinese plantation workers. In 1931
>there were around 950 Chinese in
Western Samoa,
nearly
>all indentured contract labour. Consequently some
>planters supported
direct Colonial Office control, and
>later full independence, but with the
planters still
>in charge. Later R.W. Robson, a "Pacific Islands
>Monthly"
correspondent, claimed that Savage had been
>so pleased with Frank's efforts that
he had offerred
>him the position of Administrator of Western Samoa.
>Robson was
personally highly critical of Frank
>("Pacific Islands Monthly" 3/1943
p8).
>
>Michael Field in "Mau, Samoa's struggle for freedom"
>(Auckland,
Polynesian Press, 1991) describes Frank's
>anger with some Samoans who wanted
full protectorate
>rather than mandate status. Nevertheless, Frank
>believed he
had achieved reconciliation between the
>Mau and the traditional leaders in the
Fono a Faipule,
>and
returned with recommendations for government
>action. In 1938 the Samoa Act was
amended to, amongst
>other provisions, allow Faipules to be chosen for the
>Fono
according to Samoan custom. He also repealed the
>1927 amendment to the Act
allowing deportation of
>those deemed working against the local New
Zealand
>administration. Nelson, and two others, had been
>deported under these
provisions.
>
>Angus Ross in his "New Zealand's record in the Pacific
>Islands in
the Twentieth Century (Auckland, Longman
>Paul, 1969) claims Samoans were still
dissatisfied. He
>notes most of the Mau basic proposals were met, apart
>from
financial independence, but that there still was
>not an appreciation of their
desire for autonomy. He
>also claims that Frank did not personally impress
the
>chiefly elite, and
lectured them on financial matters.
>
>Between 1935 and 1938 Frank strongly
supported
>Labour's income redistribution policies, noting they
>also recognised
the value of women and mothers in the
>home. He further supported changes to
health and
>superannuation and the 1938 Social Security Bill as
>"it has fallen
to the lot of the Labour Party to
>relieve that penury and want, and give to the
widowed
>mother and the motherless a feeling of security" (P.D.
>1938, v252,
p503). No doubt he recalled his own
>circumstances on the death of his mother. He
also
>supported the more independent foreign policy stance
>New Zealand was
adopting, welcoming New Zealand's 1936
>contribution to the League of Nations as
being the
>"first time New Zealand had exercised its right ... to
>put forward
its opinion at
the conference" (P.D.,
>1936, v 247, p880), but also stressed that New
Zealand
>was not acting in opposition to British thinking.
>
>He also pointed to
the fact that the Government had
>"largely increased expenditure on internal
and
>overseas advertising, and in expanding the work of
>"Filmcraft", its studio at
Mirimar, Wellington"
>(Flashlight, 1 January 1938, p5) and noted
>"Government's
legislation making for increased leisure
>for the enjoyment of our workers
generally".
>
>He also supported amendments to the Reserve Bank Act,
>making it a
fully state institution, but privately
>recognised that it didn't yet provide for
full
>government control of public credit. He also supported
>those in Labour's
caucus pressing for the
>nationalisation of the Bank of New Zealand.
His
>portfolios, however, restricted him to actions such as
>his 1938 Surveyors
Act which consolidated previous
>legislation on surveying, expanded the powers of
the
>Surveyor General and gave statutory authority to the
>New Zealand Institute
of Surveyors.
>
>In his egotistical "John A. Lee diaries 1936 -
1940"
>(Christchurch, Whitcoulls, 1981), Lee puts forward his
>own version of
events in Labour's parliamentary
>caucus. For the meeting of 25 August 1936
Lee
>describes a caucus decision to overturn Walter Nash's
>proposals on raising
the level of the old age pension,
>by increasing it by 25%, and on the following
day
>claims that Frank offered to resign from Cabinet
>"saying he had nothing in
common with Nash" (p10).
>Nothing eventuated from this. In the official
minutes
>(University
of Auckland Library, A 108) Frank appears
>only three times in the period 1935 -
1938. Firstly
>for his Bill on Surveyors, secondly for 12 August 1936
>when "Mr
Langstone objected to Mr Nash authoring a
>scheme of marketing which he had not
the chance of
>giving his advice. Mr Nash explained that this was due
>to Mr
Langstone's absence in Samoa and that Mr
>Langstone's advice would now be availed
of". The third
>occasion is for 10 December 1937 when he was appointed
>to the
policy committee for the 1938 election
>campaign.
>
>Lee claims that at the
meeting of 10 October 1936
>Frank voted with Caucus against Cabinet on the rate
of
>refund of an internal loan and on 23 March 1937 Frank
>supported Rex Mason
and Savage against Nash over 2%
>rentals for state housing. In his diary entry
for
24
>March 1937 he claims that Frank, Mason and Teddy
>Howard told him that
Savage didn't realise the
>magnitude of his decision In his entry for 21
August
>1937 Lee claims that Langstone again threatened to
>resign from Cabinet,
unless it accepted a minority
>report of the dairy committee. For 24 August 1937
he
>says that Frank opted for the highest figure for the
>guaranteed price for
butter while Nash opted for the
>lowest. For 28 August 1937 Lee reports that
Frank
>joined with Lee Martin, Mason and Dan Sullivan against
>the majority in
Cabinet who supported a lower price.
>
>He then claims Frank tendered his
resignation to Peter
>Fraser, who was acting leader while Savage was away.
>For 7
September 1937 Lee reports that Frank's
>resignation was deferred, with Lee
claiming to
have
>convinced Frank to stay in Cabinet and fight for
>monetary reform. Frank
was shown prior to publication,
>and approved of, Lee's pamphlet "Money power for
the
>people, Labour's way out" (Wellington, Grey Lynn
>Branch of the N.Z. Labour
Party, 1937). For 11
>September 1937 Lee refers to Frank serving with
>Sullivan,
Mason and Nash on a Cabinet committee to
>consider secondary industry, which
couldn't function
>as Nash was unavailable.
>
>For Labour's 1938 General Election
policy Frank
>preferred an emphasis on state control of credit at
>low interest
rates for farms, housing and secondary
>industry. However, the Party decided to
make this a
>secondary consideration in favour of the social
>security
legislation. The 1938 Social Security Act had
>been passed by Parliament, but was
not
to come into
>effect until April 1939, creating an incentive for
>those who
would benefit to maintain Labour in
>government.
>
>Copyright, David Verran
2004
>-
>
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