| Subject: | Re: [socialcredit] Chinese Monetary Reform: Please check the website | | Date: | Friday, March 27, 2009 13:49:00 (+0000) | | From: | Kenneth Palmerton <kenpalmerton @................uk>
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In-Reply-To: <739787.45691.qm@web53209.mail.re2.yahoo.com>
Hi Eric.
And then there is the Bretton Woods system that we never got :-(
Bancor.
Ken.
-------- Original Message --------
From: Eric Encina <ericencina@yahoo.com>
To: Anne Goss <socialcredit@fsbdial.co.uk>, Social Credit
<socialcredit@elistas.com>
Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2009 21:45:00 -0700 (PDT)
Dear Friends,
What do you think about this?
_China are calling for a new world currency_.
I am hoping for your urgent reply today.
Thank you.
Eric V. Encina
ericencina@yahoo.com
PLEASE: check this website.
Go to http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english/detail.asp?col=6500&ID=178
Reform the International Monetary System
Zhou Xiaochuan
The outbreak of the current crisis and its spillover in the world have
confronted us with a long-existing but still unanswered question,i.e.,
what kind of international reserve currency do we need to secure global
financial stability and facilitate world economic growth, which was one of
the purposes for establishing the IMF? There were various institutional
arrangements in an attempt to find a solution, including the Silver
Standard, the Gold Standard, the Gold Exchange Standard and the Bretton
Woods system. The above question, however, as the ongoing financial crisis
demonstrates, is far from being solved, and has become even more severe
due to the inherent weaknesses of the current international monetary
system.
Theoretically, an international reserve currency should first be anchored
to a stable benchmark and issued according to a clear set of rules,
therefore to ensure orderly supply; second, its supply should be flexible
enough to allow timely adjustment according to the changing demand; third,
such adjustments should be disconnected from economic conditions and
sovereign interests of any single country. The acceptance of credit-based
national currencies as major international reserve currencies, as is the
case in the current system, is a rare special case in history. The crisis
again calls for creative reform of the existing international monetary
system towards an international reserve currency with a stable value,
rule-based issuance and manageable supply, so as to achieve the objective
of safeguarding global economic and financial stability.
I. The outbreak of the crisis and its spillover to the entire world
reflect the inherent vulnerabilities and systemic risks in the existing
international monetary system.
Issuing countries of reserve currencies are constantly confronted with the
dilemma between achieving their domestic monetary policy goals and meeting
other countries' demand for reserve currencies. On the one hand,the
monetary authorities cannot simply focus on domestic goals without
carrying out their international responsibilities__on the other hand,they
cannot pursue different domestic and international objectives at the same
time. They may either fail to adequately meet the demand of a growing
global economy for liquidity as they try to ease inflation pressures at
home, or create excess liquidity in the global markets by overly
stimulating domestic demand. The Triffin Dilemma, i.e., the issuing
countries of reserve currencies cannot maintain the value of the reserve
currencies while providing liquidity to the world, still exists.
When a national currency is used in pricing primary commodities, trade
settlements and is adopted as a reserve currency globally, efforts of the
monetary authority issuing such a currency to address its economic
imbalances by adjusting exchange rate would be made in vain, as its
currency serves as a benchmark for many other currencies. While benefiting
from a widely accepted reserve currency, the globalization also suffers
from the flaws of such a system. The frequency and increasing intensity of
financial crises following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system
suggests the costs of such a system to the world may have exceeded its
benefits. The price is becoming increasingly higher, not only for the
users, but also for the issuers of the reserve currencies. Although crisis
may not necessarily be an intended result of the issuing authorities, it
is an inevitable outcome of the institutional flaws.
II. The desirable goal of reforming the international monetary system,
therefore, is to create an international reserve currency that is
disconnected from individual nations and is able to remain stable in the
long run, thus removing the inherent deficiencies caused by using
credit-based national currencies.
1. Though the super-sovereign reserve currency has long since been
proposed, yet no substantive progress has been achieved to date. Back in
the 1940s, Keynes had already proposed to introduce an international
currency unit named "Bancor", based on the value of 30 representative
commodities. Unfortunately, the proposal was not accepted. The collapse of
the Bretton Woods system, which was based on the White approach, indicates
that the Keynesian approach may have been more farsighted. The IMF also
created the SDR in 1969, when the defects of the Bretton Woods system
initially emerged, to mitigate the inherent risks sovereign reserve
currencies caused. Yet, the role of the SDR has not been put into full
play due to limitations on its allocation and the scope of its uses.
However, it serves as the light in the tunnel for the reform of the
international monetary system.
2. A super-sovereign reserve currency not only eliminates the inherent
risks of credit-based sovereign currency, but also makes it possible to
manage global liquidity. A super-sovereign reserve currency managed by a
global institution could be used to both create and control the global
liquidity. And when a country's currency is no longer used as the
yardstick for global trade and as the benchmark for other currencies, the
exchange rate policy of the country would be far more effective in
adjusting economic imbalances. This will significantly reduce the risks of
a future crisis and enhance crisis management capability.
III. The reform should be guided by a grand vision and begin with specific
deliverables. It should be a gradual process that yields win-win results
for all
The reestablishment of a new and widely accepted reserve currency with a
stable valuation benchmark may take a long time. The creation of an
international currency unit, based on the Keynesian proposal, is a bold
initiative that requires extraordinary political vision and courage. In
the short run, the international community, particularly the IMF, should
at least recognize and face up to the risks resulting from the existing
system, conduct regular monitoring and assessment and issue timely early
warnings.
Special consideration should be given to giving the SDR a greater role.
The SDR has the features and potential to act as a super-sovereign reserve
currency. Moreover, an increase in SDR allocation would help the Fund
address its resources problem and the difficulties in the voice and
representation reform. Therefore, efforts should be made to push forward a
SDR allocation. This will require political cooperation among member
countries. Specifically, the Fourth Amendment to the Articles of Agreement
and relevant resolution on SDR allocation proposed in 1997 should be
approved as soon as possible so that members joined the Fund after 1981
could also share the benefits of the SDR. On the basis of this,
considerations could be given to further increase SDR allocation.
The scope of using the SDR should be broadened, so as to enable it to
fully satisfy the member countries' demand for a reserve currency.
Set up a settlement system between the SDR and other currencies.
Therefore, the SDR, which is now only used between governments and
international institutions, could become a widely accepted means of
payment in international trade and financial transactions.
Actively promote the use of the SDR in international trade, commodities
pricing, investment and corporate book-keeping. This will help enhance the
role of the SDR, and will effectively reduce the fluctuation of prices of
assets denominated in national currencies and related risks.
Create financial assets denominated in the SDR to increase its appeal. The
introduction of SDR-denominated securities, which is being studied by the
IMF, will be a good start.
Further improve the valuation and allocation of the SDR. The basket of
currencies forming the basis for SDR valuation should be expanded to
include currencies of all major economies, and the GDP may also be
included as a weight. The allocation of the SDR can be shifted from a
purely calculation-based system to a system backed by real assets, such as
a reserve pool, to further boost market confidence in its value.
IV. Entrusting part of the member countries' reserve to the centralized
management of the IMF will not only enhance the international community's
ability to address the crisis and maintain the stability of the
international monetary and financial system, but also significantly
strengthen the role of the SDR.
1. Compared with separate management of reserves by individual countries,
the centralized management of part of the global reserve by a trustworthy
international institution with a reasonable return to encourage
participation will be more effective in deterring speculation and
stabilizing financial markets. The participating countries can also save
some reserve for domestic development and economic growth. With its
universal membership, its unique mandate of maintaining monetary and
financial stability, and as an international "supervisor" on the
macroeconomic policies of its member countries, the IMF, equipped with its
expertise, is endowed with a natural advantage to act as the manager of
its member countries' reserves.
2. The centralized management of its member countries' reserves by the
Fund will be an effective measure to promote a greater role of the SDR as
a reserve currency. To achieve this, the IMF can set up an open-ended
SDR-denominated fund based on the market practice, allowing subscription
and redemption in the existing reserve currencies by various investors as
desired. This arrangement will not only promote the development of
SDR-denominated assets, but will also partially allow management of the
liquidity in the form of the existing reserve currencies. It can even lay
a foundation for increasing SDR allocation to gradually replace existing
reserve currencies with the SDR.
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