|Subject:||Re: [socialcredit] Chinese Monetary Reform: Please check the website|
|Date:||Friday, March 27, 2009 14:57:00 (+0000)|
|From:||Kenneth Palmerton <kenpalmerton @................uk>
Thomas Greco, an old and much respected friend knows, because I told him
:-) that he treads a well worn path in his search for a commodity standard.
In fact another respected acquaintance, the late Ivor Pierce Emeritus
Professor of economics at Southampton University here in the UK spent a
whole long life trying to construct such a commodity standard.
He died an unhappy man, having admitted that he, and the team he had work
for him, and a close collaborator, the French economics Professor Allaise,
had failed :-(((
I believe it is a delusion to even think of money having a value of itself.
-------- Original Message --------
From: "Graeme Taylor" <email@example.com>
Date: Fri, 27 Mar 2009 15:27:47 +1100
I agree William
The nature of the money system is that the units of a currency are of
because people think they are. That "legal tender" is required to pay tax
gives cause for people to believe that the units of money really do have a
Reading the Chinese perspective, it's as if, after nearly a thousand
they still believe that the khasars really did have sufficient gold tucked
away somewhere, that matched the money they used to "control trade" on the
Many western commemtators call for "gold backed" money, but that would
simply remove most gold from the market. Tom Greco (hi Tom) suggests a
"basket of commodities", but the zen of it all, is that the biggest
obviously the best measurer, is the market itself. Think about it.
The de-facto reserve currency, the US dollar, was/ maybe still is
underwritten by wars of aggression, should a nation attempt to sell oil in
other currencies. So it's given value by people, because it buys oil.
Besides, god only knows how many trillions of printed US dollars fell off
the back of troop trucks whilst overseas, so the US dollar is not a good
base measure, since we don't know how many already exist before the banks
start creating and extinguishing new money over the top.
The unknown quantity of US dollars floating round the planet surely suits
mafia, triad and cia type orgs.
that's my two cents worth
----- Original Message -----
From: "William Hugh McGunnigle" <To: <firstname.lastname@example.org>
Sent: Friday, March 27, 2009 2:08 PM
Subject: Re: [socialcredit] Chinese Monetary Reform: Please check the
> Good Point Per. There is a massive problem that under our present
> system any proposed International Reserve currency will be controlled by
> International consortium of Bankers who would then be able to manipulate
> currency exchange values in ratio to the International unit to serve
> own selfish ends in a far more effective way than they do at present. The
> only proper way of establishing currency consistency would be by
> the costs of various commercial Items in each country and then adjusting
> currency value ratios with respect to them eg if a house costs $ 100000
> the USA but only $1000 for a comparable house in say NZ then the exchange
> rate along those lines would be $10 US for $1 NZ. This would not suit the
> money manipulators, but would ensure that people would find that their
> effectrive 'wealth' with respect to obtaining property etc would not
> as they move from country to country. It would also prevent those whose
> currencies are artificially held at abnormally high rates could not use
> power to buy up property in a less well favoured country by out bidding
> local people for that property simply because of the currency diferences
> that exist at present. I can see massive objections to this method of
> currency comparison, because it would interfere with much of the way our
> present currency system operates. It would also interfere with the
> of transfering manufacturing potential from high industrial cost areas
> the West to India and China, becasue there would be no advantage in
> because equal work would provide equal recompense. Any comments?
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Per Almgren" <email@example.com>
> To: <firstname.lastname@example.org>
> Cc: "Anne Goss" <email@example.com>
> Sent: Friday, March 27, 2009 10:59 AM
> Subject: Re: [socialcredit] Chinese Monetary Reform: Please check the
>>I do not think that we even need an international reserve currency. All
>>currencies should be floating to each other. What is needed is that the
>>system is free of interest and investors demand for profit.
>> Per Almgren
>> Eric Encina skrev:
>>> Dear Friends,
>>> What do you think about this?
>>> _China are calling for a new world currency_.
>>> I am hoping for your urgent reply today.
>>> Thank you.
>>> Eric V. Encina
>>> *PLEASE: check this website.*
>>> Go to http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english/detail.asp?col=6500&ID=178
>>> Reform the International Monetary System
>>> Zhou Xiaochuan
>>> The outbreak of the current crisis and its spillover in the world
>>> have confronted us with a long-existing but still unanswered
>>> question,i.e., what kind of international reserve currency do we
>>> need to secure global financial stability and facilitate world
>>> economic growth, which was one of the purposes for establishing
>>> the IMF? There were various institutional arrangements in an
>>> attempt to find a solution, including the Silver Standard, the
>>> Gold Standard, the Gold Exchange Standard and the Bretton Woods
>>> system. The above question, however, as the ongoing financial
>>> crisis demonstrates, is far from being solved, and has become even
>>> more severe due to the inherent weaknesses of the current
>>> international monetary system.
>>> Theoretically, an international reserve currency should first be
>>> anchored to a stable benchmark and issued according to a clear set
>>> of rules, therefore to ensure orderly supply; second, its supply
>>> should be flexible enough to allow timely adjustment according to
>>> the changing demand; third, such adjustments should be
>>> disconnected from economic conditions and sovereign interests of
>>> any single country. The acceptance of credit-based national
>>> currencies as major international reserve currencies, as is the
>>> case in the current system, is a rare special case in history. The
>>> crisis again calls for creative reform of the existing
>>> international monetary system towards an international reserve
>>> currency with a stable value, rule-based issuance and manageable
>>> supply, so as to achieve the objective of safeguarding global
>>> economic and financial stability.
>>> I. The outbreak of the crisis and its spillover to the entire
>>> world reflect the inherent vulnerabilities and systemic risks in
>>> the existing international monetary system.
>>> Issuing countries of reserve currencies are constantly confronted
>>> with the dilemma between achieving their domestic monetary policy
>>> goals and meeting other countries' demand for reserve currencies.
>>> On the one hand,the monetary authorities cannot simply focus on
>>> domestic goals without carrying out their international
>>> responsibilities__on the other hand,they cannot pursue different
>>> domestic and international objectives at the same time. They may
>>> either fail to adequately meet the demand of a growing global
>>> economy for liquidity as they try to ease inflation pressures at
>>> home, or create excess liquidity in the global markets by overly
>>> stimulating domestic demand. The Triffin Dilemma, i.e., the
>>> issuing countries of reserve currencies cannot maintain the value
>>> of the reserve currencies while providing liquidity to the world,
>>> still exists.
>>> When a national currency is used in pricing primary commodities,
>>> trade settlements and is adopted as a reserve currency globally,
>>> efforts of the monetary authority issuing such a currency to
>>> address its economic imbalances by adjusting exchange rate would
>>> be made in vain, as its currency serves as a benchmark for many
>>> other currencies. While benefiting from a widely accepted reserve
>>> currency, the globalization also suffers from the flaws of such a
>>> system. The frequency and increasing intensity of financial crises
>>> following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system suggests the
>>> costs of such a system to the world may have exceeded its
>>> benefits. The price is becoming increasingly higher, not only for
>>> the users, but also for the issuers of the reserve currencies.
>>> Although crisis may not necessarily be an intended result of the
>>> issuing authorities, it is an inevitable outcome of the
>>> institutional flaws.
>>> II. The desirable goal of reforming the international monetary
>>> system, therefore, is to create an international reserve currency
>>> that is disconnected from individual nations and is able to remain
>>> stable in the long run, thus removing the inherent deficiencies
>>> caused by using credit-based national currencies.
>>> 1. Though the super-sovereign reserve currency has long since been
>>> proposed, yet no substantive progress has been achieved to date.
>>> Back in the 1940s, Keynes had already proposed to introduce an
>>> international currency unit named "Bancor", based on the value of
>>> 30 representative commodities. Unfortunately, the proposal was not
>>> accepted. The collapse of the Bretton Woods system, which was
>>> based on the White approach, indicates that the Keynesian approach
>>> may have been more farsighted. The IMF also created the SDR in
>>> 1969, when the defects of the Bretton Woods system initially
>>> emerged, to mitigate the inherent risks sovereign reserve
>>> currencies caused. Yet, the role of the SDR has not been put into
>>> full play due to limitations on its allocation and the scope of
>>> its uses. However, it serves as the light in the tunnel for the
>>> reform of the international monetary system.
>>> 2. A super-sovereign reserve currency not only eliminates the
>>> inherent risks of credit-based sovereign currency, but also makes
>>> it possible to manage global liquidity. A super-sovereign reserve
>>> currency managed by a global institution could be used to both
>>> create and control the global liquidity. And when a country's
>>> currency is no longer used as the yardstick for global trade and
>>> as the benchmark for other currencies, the exchange rate policy of
>>> the country would be far more effective in adjusting economic
>>> imbalances. This will significantly reduce the risks of a future
>>> crisis and enhance crisis management capability.
>>> III. The reform should be guided by a grand vision and begin with
>>> specific deliverables. It should be a gradual process that yields
>>> win-win results for all
>>> The reestablishment of a new and widely accepted reserve currency
>>> with a stable valuation benchmark may take a long time. The
>>> creation of an international currency unit, based on the Keynesian
>>> proposal, is a bold initiative that requires extraordinary
>>> political vision and courage. In the short run, the international
>>> community, particularly the IMF, should at least recognize and
>>> face up to the risks resulting from the existing system, conduct
>>> regular monitoring and assessment and issue timely early warnings.
>>> Special consideration should be given to giving the SDR a greater
>>> role. The SDR has the features and potential to act as a
>>> super-sovereign reserve currency. Moreover, an increase in SDR
>>> allocation would help the Fund address its resources problem and
>>> the difficulties in the voice and representation reform.
>>> Therefore, efforts should be made to push forward a SDR
>>> allocation. This will require political cooperation among member
>>> countries. Specifically, the Fourth Amendment to the Articles of
>>> Agreement and relevant resolution on SDR allocation proposed in
>>> 1997 should be approved as soon as possible so that members joined
>>> the Fund after 1981 could also share the benefits of the SDR. On
>>> the basis of this, considerations could be given to further
>>> increase SDR allocation.
>>> The scope of using the SDR should be broadened, so as to enable it
>>> to fully satisfy the member countries' demand for a reserve
>>> Set up a settlement system between the SDR and other currencies.
>>> Therefore, the SDR, which is now only used between governments and
>>> international institutions, could become a widely accepted means
>>> of payment in international trade and financial transactions.
>>> Actively promote the use of the SDR in international trade,
>>> commodities pricing, investment and corporate book-keeping. This
>>> will help enhance the role of the SDR, and will effectively reduce
>>> the fluctuation of prices of assets denominated in national
>>> currencies and related risks.
>>> Create financial assets denominated in the SDR to increase its
>>> appeal. The introduction of SDR-denominated securities, which is
>>> being studied by the IMF, will be a good start.
>>> Further improve the valuation and allocation of the SDR. The
>>> basket of currencies forming the basis for SDR valuation should be
>>> expanded to include currencies of all major economies, and the GDP
>>> may also be included as a weight. The allocation of the SDR can be
>>> shifted from a purely calculation-based system to a system backed
>>> by real assets, such as a reserve pool, to further boost market
>>> confidence in its value.
>>> IV. Entrusting part of the member countries' reserve to the
>>> centralized management of the IMF will not only enhance the
>>> international community's ability to address the crisis and
>>> maintain the stability of the international monetary and financial
>>> system, but also significantly strengthen the role of the SDR.
>>> 1. Compared with separate management of reserves by individual
>>> countries, the centralized management of part of the global
>>> reserve by a trustworthy international institution with a
>>> reasonable return to encourage participation will be more
>>> effective in deterring speculation and stabilizing financial
>>> markets. The participating countries can also save some reserve
>>> for domestic development and economic growth. With its universal
>>> membership, its unique mandate of maintaining monetary and
>>> financial stability, and as an international "supervisor" on the
>>> macroeconomic policies of its member countries, the IMF, equipped
>>> with its expertise, is endowed with a natural advantage to act as
>>> the manager of its member countries' reserves.
>>> 2. The centralized management of its member countries' reserves by
>>> the Fund will be an effective measure to promote a greater role of
>>> the SDR as a reserve currency. To achieve this, the IMF can set up
>>> an open-ended SDR-denominated fund based on the market practice,
>>> allowing subscription and redemption in the existing reserve
>>> currencies by various investors as desired. This arrangement will
>>> not only promote the development of SDR-denominated assets, but
>>> will also partially allow management of the liquidity in the form
>>> of the existing reserve currencies. It can even lay a foundation
>>> for increasing SDR allocation to gradually replace existing
>>> reserve currencies with the SDR.
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