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Thanks to Wally for this clarification on several
points.
One of the most useful, given the tack I wish
to take, is his affirmation of an evolutionary perspective on the part of
Douglas. On a moment's reflection, it is almost redundant to
underscore this point, for the very idea of reform implies evolution, whether of
an individual or society. "Progress" may be a more popular term,
especially in these days of political correctness, but it still carries with it
the notion of a change that becomes incorporated and therefore has a
prospect of continuity if not permanence.
The Douglas perspective, then, embraces the notion
that individuals can and do evolve (perhaps develop is a better term) by
learning, self-discipline and application of innate abilities, but that
this process can be aided or inhibited by institutions. If personal
development is deemed to be the ideal purpose of human existence, then social
policy should be designed to assist in those individual endeavors. I
suspect that is what Wally means below where he says that "institutions were
meant to serve the individual and not the reverse". (It is not the case
that they were in fact designed that way, but rather that they ought to have
been. Otherwise, why reform?)
With the concept of human potential in
mind, Douglas asked himself what could be done in the way of institutional
reform to let it flourish more abundantly. We have his answer,
in analyses of the meaning of money, the monopoly of credit, the A+B
theorem and the inadequacy of credit and in his prescriptions for a National
Credit Authority, consumer dividends and retailer rebates. This
achievement, from aspiration to completion, is a noble example of
utopist or utopian mental effort as I have argued
extensively in a posting on or about March 15, and elsewhere--without the
slightest implication of pejorative intent. (cf. "Utopian dreaming" of
3/15/05)
The perplexing issue, for his disciples, is
why Douglas' design has not been adopted. I have noticed a few
potential explanations over the course of these discussions, but none of them
seems adequate to me. In the remainder of this post I will make a brief
sketch of what I think is wrong and how it should be redressed, leaving for
later a more thorough exposition of the individual points.
1. Jim Schroeder, in proposing a change of
pace, suggests that more attention should be paid to Douglas'
philosophy. While I find philosophy more interesting than
mechanics (read "economics"), I do not agree with Jim that the answer
to our problem will be found by delving very far into the compulsive intricacies
of Kierkegaard's explorations, for example.
2. On the other hand, I do agree that the
word philosophy, especially as used by Douglas, is a significant
barrier to more effective communication with others and to a more accurate
perception of their problem by disciples. The thread on this is from Vic
Bridger on 3/29/05, "re philosophy", my rejoinder to Vic of 4/01/05, and his
response of 4/04-5/05. I have not yet replied to his latest, but note here
that some hot button words appear to have distracted his attention and caused
him to be mistaken in his interpretation and conclusions.
3. In particular, I continue to disbelieve
that Douglas' vision of what ought to be is the source of disinterest in his
policies. The continual refrain that those who don't buy his policy don't
share his "philosophy" strikes me as the same kind of nonsense as the "binary"
economists' plaint that if you don't agree with their analysis it's because
you don't want people to have productive property. Economic democracy is
not an exclusive to Douglas or his followers. It is in fact a plausible
inference from a British track in standard economic thinking that once bore the
title of welfare economics (and was the focus of my effort as a graduate
student).
4. It is the analysis that fails to be
persuasive, as manifested by the continual focus on A+B etc. whenever the
subject of social credit comes up with someone who has the slightest interest in
analytic economics.The issue, therefore, ought to be how to make our analyses
more effective. I think that John Rawson has the right idea in that it
ought to be based more firmly in empiricism, but I wonder if he has the
wrong focus. If I understand him correctly, John wants to reinforce the
deductive apparatus of A+B. That's mainly just more deduction, when I
suspect that Douglas has already done that part quite thoroughly and well.
The real empirical challenge is the revised system of national accounts,
including balance sheet, to support the eventual creation of a National Credit
Authority.
5. As Victor has acknowledged (4/10, re
"Brutish Utopia), getting that system into place will not be easy. He
furthermore noted that Douglas identified it as "the second trench to be taken",
following on the primary task of destroying th existing monopoly of credit
(excuse me if I have used the wrong phrase). I notice that quite a bit of
the literature presumes that the empirical part is relatively trivial (including
the egregious remarks of Bill Ryan on the "Brutish Utopia" exchange). This
is a mistake, in my opinion, and Victor has essentially agreed. It seems
to me that it will be hard to get rid of the existing system (first trench)
without having something to offer immediately in its place, and that something
must be a demonstration of the capacity to calculate effectively and to a
reasonable approximation of accuracy the dividend and price
rebate. Two trenches is the wrong metaphor, therefore. There
are two big tasks, but they are complementary and must be addressed
simultaneously. Instead of beating their gums deductively for all these
years, why haven't campaigners for social credit been chipping away at the
building up at least an approximation or shadow system of the necessary national
accounts. If they were in place, would it not be much easier to illustrate
the potential operation of the policy?
Keith Wilde
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Wednesday, April 20, 2005 5:24
PM
Subject: Re: [socialcredit] a change of
pace
Douglas made quite clear the role of human
association in producing otherwise impossible results whether for human
satisfaction or otherwise. His concepts of the Unearned Increment of
Association and the Cultural Heritage embody this idea. What is
crucial is the engagement of the individual in association by voluntary rather
than coerced involvement. The individual chooses to associate in the
anticipation that some desired and beneficial result will be achieved.
He or she must have the right to contract out of an association if it is not
delivering the desired results. This right leaves individuals with the
power to atrophy a function if it is not performing satisfactorily in the
opinon of the individual, or of individuals.
This contrasts with, e.g., Lenin's static concept
of "democratic centralism" wherein issues may be debated and, once
decided upon by the group, must be adhered to or one's fate is the gulag or
the firing squad. The group appropriates to itself the role of God and
executes arbitrary action upon all persons involved.
Contrariwise, Social Credit believes that
ultimate authority belongs with a suprahuman authority which transcends
the group and mankind itself. Insofar as he does not trangress the
rights of other persons, the individual has a right in natural law not to be
coerced by others. He has an obligation as an individual to make moral
and practical choices--which may bear upon the general condition of
society. Organizaton has practical value but it needs to be capable of
change and should not be frozen by arbitary human authority. Policy
should respond to the desires of individuals rather than the dictates of
central command. Institutions were meant to serve the individual and not
the reverse. Ad hoc action directed to achievement of limited objectives
is a characteristic of free association and should be something which is
recognized as inherent in the nature of human relationships.
For humans, the individual is of central
importance and the evolution, development and refinement of the
individual is of prime importance. In this sense Douglas regarded the
the coercive group, dominating the subservient personality, as an
atavism. That is, the desirable trend is for the individual to be
emancipated from the group. We do not want an unthinking herd of
Gaderine swine which can be led, or pushed, over any cliff. The
ability to discriminate is the mark of the developed and civilized individual
and is the fundamental basis of human advancement up the scale of
civilization.
No one is being forced to engage in concerted
effort to promote the advance of Social Credit policy. It is held up as
something which might kindle the imagination and desires of the listener with
the hope that individuals may volutarily unite in demanding its
institution. I see no contradiction in all of this--and I certainly see
no more realistic or attractive alternative to it. I think that Douglas
would have disputed the concept of a "collective" will and would have spoken
more in terms of a general desire of individual wills desirous for
certain results, in the material field of economics material security being of
prime importance.
Wally
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Monday, April 18, 2005 4:40
PM
Subject: Re: [socialcredit] a change of
pace
Very interesting questions! I have not read Kierkegaard, so
cannot answer your most direct question, but the questions themselves have
also been on my mind.
I will ask my resident philosopher about K, but she is also an
anthropologist and I suspect will have some strong observations about the
notion that human nature is individualistic as contrasted to group
identification and action.
From my own limited reading in the latter subject, it seems that most
students attach a lot of importance to the group as a key element in the
evolution of humanity. Furthermore, the very idea of cultural heritage
seems to embrace the notion that technology is a collective creation in
part, although the contribution of individuals is undeniable. And why
are we talking about social credit if the individual is
autonomous?
A strong undertone of these discussions is criticism of 'standard'
economics, yet one of the paramount features in that ideology is the
presumption that individual choices are not only the normative basis of the
system but also the explanation for what happens.
Douglas' way of getting to the maximum state of individual freedom
depends on their first being a massive action of collective will.
Is there not some contradiction at work here?
Keith Wilde
Jim <jschroeder@shaw.ca>
wrote:
Pondering the philosophy of Social Credit I
am apt to wonder if Douglas was not to Kierkegaard what Marx was to
Hegel.
Kierkegaard and Hegel were intellectual
adversaries much like Marx and Douglas. Of course Marx's theories
were based on the philosophy of Hegel. I wonder if Douglas was
familiar with Kierkegaard?
In "Social Credit" Douglas
states:
"The vast majority of
discussions which take place in regard to industrial problems are
prevented from arriving at any conclusion from the fact that the
disputants do not realise the premises on which their arguments are based,
and in many cases use words (and "justice" is an example of such words)
which beg the whole question at issue. It is not too much to say that one
of the root ideas through which Christianity comes into conflict with the
conceptions of the Old Testament and the ideals of the pre-Christian era, is
in respect of this dethronement of abstractionism. That is the issue which
is posed by the Doctrine of the Incarnation."
Kierkegaard
attacked Hegel most vociferously for his philosophy based on
idealism/abstractionism. Kierkegaard's philosphy starts with
existence, and the study of what it is to exist. Through this he
develops the idea of God incarnate, and rejects the speculative
philosophy of Hegel as a "phantasm" not based in existence, but based on
pure speculation/abstraction.
Kierkegaard said, "Human existence has
Idea in it, but it is not a purely ideal existence. Plato
placed the Idea in the second rank of existence, as intermediary between
God and matter; an existing human being does indeed participate in
the Idea, but he is not himself Idea." (Concluding Unscientific
Postscript)
Douglas also displays this philosophy when he
says:
"One of the first
facts to be observed as part of the social ideal which leans for its
sanctions on rewards and punishments, is the elevation of the group ideal
and the minimising of individuality, i.e. the treatment of
individuality as subordinate to, e.g. nationality. The
manifestations of this idea are almost endless. We have the national idea,
the class or international idea, the identification of the individual with
the race, the school, the regiment, the profession, and so forth. There is
probably no more subtle and elusive subject than the consideration of the
exact relation of the group in all these and countless other forms, to the
individuals who compose the groups. But as far as it is possible to sum
the matter up, the general problem seems to be involved in a decision as
to whether the individual should be sacrificed to the group or whether the
fruits of group activity should be always at the disposal of the
individual."
The elevation of group over the idividual is the
elevation of Idea over existence. Individuals exist. Nations,
races, classes are ideals.
Douglas states that discussions on industrial
problems remain unresolved because philosophical premises are not made
explicit. I believe that the philosophy of Social Credit is as
important, if not more important, than the A+B theorem
itself.
I'm wondering if anyone knows if Douglas
references Kierkegaard in any way?
I also wonder why the discussions in this forum
seem to focus solely on A+B and the economics of Social Credit, when much
of Douglas work is based on his philosophy?
Cheers,
Jim
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