| Subject: | [socialcredit] Fwd: Re: Distributism and Trade - Thumbnail Sketch On Where We Stand | | Date: | Monday, April 18, 2005 15:05:32 (-0700) | | From: | William B. Ryan <w_b_ryan @.....com>
|
Note: forwarded message attached.
Please note that what he refers to as the "original
book" is actually the third book.
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| Subject: | RE: [distributism] Re: Distributism and Trade - Thumbnail Sketch On Where We Stand | | Date: | Monday, April 18, 2005 22:01:57 (+0100) | | From: | Dave Taylor <dave @.....................uk>
|
At 02:47 PM 4/18/2005 +0100, Dave Taylor wrote:
>> Don't get me wrong, I think that Henry George (and after him, Major
>>Douglas)
>After reading a ton of "Social Credit" literature, I have never been able
>to make heads or tails of the whole thing. [John]
But have you read the original book? It starts:
"WE have in England, probably to a greater extent than elsewhere, two
distinct systems of education flourishing side by side. The distinction is
clearly marked in the public schools and universities; but it is traceable
through every grade of educational institution by the arrangements which are
made to prepare candidates for public and other examinations. These two
systems in the Public Schools are the Classical and the Modem sides, and
have their equivalent Triposes and Honours Schools in the universities. One
of these systems is Aristotelean, the second is Baconian.
I suspect your training was Classical, and that rather than any
failing Douglas's exposition is why you do not understand him. (He like me
was trained as an engineer). But surely THIS bit of exposition is
intelligible to you?
"Now, it does not seem to be so clearly realised as it should be, that these
two systems of education are, considered separately, incompatible. The
classical system is the embodiment of an attractive and artistic ideal or
conception of the nature of society, and the conditions under which society
lives, moves, and has its being. It is above, outside, possibly in advance
of, facts. The modern school, of which inductive natural science, based upon
the experimental ascertainment of fact, is the backbone, has not essentially
to do with ideals at all. It is realistic; its first postulate is that
forces act in a similar manner when placed in a similar relation to each
other. It refuses to admit, as a fact, anything which cannot be
demonstrated, and as a theory, anything which does not fit the facts. For
example, the classical ideal contends that men "ought" to be good, brave and
virtuous. The modern, that it does not understand the meaning of goodness,
that bravery and virtue are not capable of exact definition, and, that so
far as the word "ought" has any meaning, it postulates the existence of a
force so far undemonstrated.
"It will be recognised on a moderate consideration, that the effect on the
everyday world of these two philosophies cannot fail to be disruptive. The
logical outcome of the classical ideal is to lay the emphasis of any
observed defects in the social organisation on defects in the characters of
the persons composing the society. Wars occur because people are wicked,
poverty, because people are idle, crime, because they are immoral. Material
progress, which in its essence is applied Science, is repulsive to the
Classical mind, because it does, in fact, stultify the rigid Classical
ideal. Conversely, the scientific attitude tends to the opposite extreme,
towards what is called Determinism; that people's actions, thoughts, and
morals, are the outcome of more or less blind forces to which they are
subjected, and in regard to which, both censure and praise are equally out
of place.
"It is probable that, as in many controversies, there is a good deal to be
said for both points of view, but it is even more probable that approximate
truth lies in appreciation of the fact that neither conception is useful
without the other. It is probable that in the less fortunately situated
strata of society, a theory of economic Determinism would be a sound and
accurate explanation for the actions of 98 per cent of the persons to whom
it might be applied; that those persons are, in fact, obliged to act and
think in accordance with limitations which are imposed upon them by their
environment. In short, that their environment is more powerful in shaping
them, than they are in shaping their environment. But this is not true of
their more fortunate contemporaries. There are, without a doubt,
circumstances in the world, in which the personal conceptions of individuals
can have powerful and far-reaching consequences on their immediate and even
national or continental environment. It seems reasonable to believe that a
Napoleon, a Washington, or a Bismarck have, in effect, changed the course of
history, just as it is certain that a James Watt, a George Stephenson, or a
Faraday, have altered the centre of gravity of industrial and economic
society.
"All this is sufficiently obvious, but the important idea to be drawn from
it, is that before human ideals (including the Classical and religious
ideals) can be brought into any effective relationship with and control by
the great mass of the population, that population must be released from the
undue pressure of economic forces. ...
The title of this chapter is "Static and Dynamic Sociology", for the
Classical focus is on static ideals and the Modern on how to achieve them.
Referring back to an earlier discussion, the contrast between the Binary
(earnings + dividends) and Social Credit positions seems to be that in the
Binary system most dividends will go to those who have most, whereas in the
Social Credit scheme they are distributed equitably through lower prices. I
think a Citizen's Income achieves the same end more simply and elegantly,
but the following snippet is already highlighting the key issue:
"It is true enough that [those who control the general credit] can
manufacture "money" to an almost unlimited extent; this power resting on the
general willingness of the public to accept anything which will function as
money. But the psychology which has grown up on the basis of the theory of
rewards and punishments forbids the exercise of this power, except in return
for services rendered. ... the result of . creations of credit granted to
producers only, instead of to consumers, is to produce a rise of prices
which nullifies the additional purchasing-power thus created. ... it is
frequently argued in quarters which might be expected to know better, that a
rise of prices would be an advantage, because it would decrease the burden
of the National Debt, since the amount of money represented by the National
Debt would have a decreased purchasing-power in goods and services. There
could hardly be a more vicious example of the classical or static method of
thought and argument."
Douglas, in the slump of 1933, aimed directly at reversing this and
giving credit (but not debt) to consumers, the amount given being enough to
keep prices and therefore employment stable, the mechanism like a negative
sales tax. A bit simplistic, in that it neglects the dangerously cumulative
effect of usury; but certainly on the right lines.
Dave
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